When ties and incomplete preference lists are permitted in the Stable Marriage and Hospitals/Residents problems, stable matchings can have different sizes. The problem of finding a maximum cardinality stable matching in this context is known to be NP-hard, even under very severe restrictions on the number, size and position of ties. In this paper, we describe polynomial-time 5/3-approximation algorithms for variants of these problems in which ties are on one side only and at the end of the preference lists. The particular variant is motivated by important applications in large scale centralised matching schemes.
Introduction
Background An instance I of the Hospitals/Residents problem with Ties (HRT) comprises a set R = {r 1 , . . . , r n 1 } of residents and a set H = {h 1 , . . . , h n 2 } of hospitals. Each resident r i ∈ R has an acceptable set of hospitals that she ranks in order of preference, with ties (consisting of two or more hospitals of equal preference) being permitted, forming r i 's preference list.
Meanwhile each hospital h j ∈ H ranks in order of preference those residents who find h j acceptable, again with ties being permitted, yielding h j 's preference list. Finally, h j has an associated capacity, denoted by c j ∈ Z + , indicating the number of posts that h j has. If a resident r i and a hospital h j appear on each other's preference list then (r i , h j ) is called an acceptable pair. If h j precedes h k on r i 's list then r i is said to prefer h j to h k (with prefer being defined analogously in the case of a hospital).
An assignment M is a set of acceptable pairs. If (r i , h j ) ∈ M , we say that r i is assigned to h j , and h j is assigned r i . For any q ∈ R ∪ H, we denote by M (q) the set of assignees of q in M . If r i ∈ R and M (r i ) = ∅, we say that r i is unassigned, otherwise r i is assigned. Similarly, a hospital h j is under-subscribed, full, or over-subscribed according as |M (h j )| is less than, equal to, or greater than c j , respectively.
A matching M is an assignment such that |M (r i )| ≤ 1 for each r i ∈ R and |M (h j )| ≤ c j for each h j ∈ H (i.e., each resident is assigned to at most one hospital, and no hospital is over-subscribed). For convenience, given a resident r i ∈ R such that M (r i ) = ∅, the notation M (r i ) is also used to refer to the single member of the set M (r i ).
An acceptable pair (r i , h j ) is a blocking pair for a matching M , or blocks M , if r i is either unassigned in M or prefers h j to M (r i ), and simultaneously h j is either undersubscribed in M or prefers r i to at least one member of M (h j ). A matching for which there is no blocking pair is said to be stable. (This notion of stability is also referred to as weak stability in contexts where other forms of stability are discussed [11, 15, 16] . ) HRT is an extension of the classical Hospitals / Residents problem (HR) (or College Admissions problem) introduced by Gale and Shapley [4] . In an instance of HR, all preference lists are strictly ordered. The classical Stable Marriage problem (SM) can be viewed as a restriction of HR in which each hospital has capacity one, n 1 = n 2 = n and the preference lists are complete (i.e., the set of acceptable pairs is precisely R × H). In such a case, the residents and hospitals are more commonly referred to as the men and women respectively.
Gale and Shapley proved that, for every instance of SM, there is at least one stable matching, and they described an O(n 2 ) time algorithm to find such a matching; this has come to be known as the Gale-Shapley algorithm. This algorithm is easily extended to the case in which the numbers of men and women differ and preference lists are incomplete (SMI -Stable Marriage with Incomplete lists, which is a special case of HR in which each hospital has capacity one), and it has complexity O(L) in this case, where L is the sum of the lengths of all of the preference lists [6] . In the case of SMI, not all men and women need be assigned in a stable matching.
The Gale-Shapley algorithm may be applied from either the men's side or the women's side, and in general these two applications will produce different stable matchings. When applied from the men's side, the man-optimal stable matching is found; in this, every man has the best assignee that he can have in any stable matching, and every woman the worst. When the algorithm is applied from the women's side, the woman-optimal stable matching results, with analogous properties. Exceptionally, the man-optimal and woman-optimal stable matchings may coincide, in which case this is the unique stable matching, but in general there may be other stable matchings -possibly exponentially many [13] -between these two extremes. However, for a given instance of SMI, all stable matchings have the same size and assign exactly the same sets of men and women [5, 22] .
Two variants of the Gale-Shapley algorithm have also been formulated for the HR context [6, Section 1.6], with the complexity also being O(L) in each case, producing the resident-optimal and hospital-optimal stable matchings, with analogous optimality properties to those of the man-optimal and woman-optimal stable matchings in the SM case, respectively. Again, for a given instance of HR, all stable matchings have the same size and assign exactly the same set of residents [5, 22] .
The situation for HRT is dramatically different. Again, at least one stable matching exists for every instance, and can be found in O(L) time by breaking all ties in an arbitrary way to give an instance of HR, and applying the Gale-Shapley algorithm to that instance. However, the ways in which ties are broken can significantly affect the outcome. In particular, not all stable matchings need be of the same size, and in the most extreme case, there may be two stable matchings M and M with |M | = 2|M | [20] . Furthermore, the problem of finding a stable matching of maximum cardinality for an instance of HRT -problem MAX-HRT -is NP-hard [20] . This hardness result holds even if each hospital has capacity one -in other words, for the so-called Stable Marriage problem with Ties and Incomplete lists (SMTI), thus establishing NP-hardness of the problem MAX-SMTI. Furthermore, the result holds even under severe restrictions on the ties: for example, if the ties are on one side only, each list contains at most one tie, and that tie, if present, is at the end of the list [20] .
Practical applications
The practical importance of stable matching problems arises from their application in the assignment of applicants to positions in various job markets. The Hospitals/Residents problem gained its name because of its widespread application in the medical employment domain [1, 12, 21, 22, 24] .
Variants of the extended Gale-Shapley algorithm for HR are routinely used in a number of countries, including the United States [21] , Canada [1] and Scotland [24] , to allocate graduating medical students to hospital posts, and in a variety of other countries and contexts. In large scale matching schemes of this kind, participants, particularly large popular hospitals, may not be able to provide a genuine strict preference order over what may be a very large number of applicants, so that HRT is a more appropriate model than HR. If artificial tie-breaking is carried out, either by the participant, because a strictly ordered list is required by the matching scheme, or by the administrators of the scheme, prior to running an algorithm that requires strict preferences, then the size of the resulting stable matching is likely to be affected. Breaking ties in different ways will typically yield stable matchings of different sizes; what would be ideal would be to find a way of breaking the ties that maximises the size of the resulting stable matching, but the NP-hardness of this problem makes this an objective that is unlikely to be feasible.
One restricted case of HRT that has arisen in practice, for example in the Scottish Foundation Allocation Scheme (SFAS) [12, 24] , is where all residents' preference lists are strictly-ordered, and hospitals' lists may contain one tie, of arbitrary length, at the end of the list. The correspondingly restricted version of SMTI, where all men's lists are strict and women's lists may contain one tie at the end, is, of course, the special case of the restricted HRT problem in which all hospital capacities are equal to one. We refer to these restricted versions of SMTI and HRT as Special SMTI/HRT (SSMTI/SHRT), and use the terms MAX-SSMTI and MAX-SHRT for the problems of finding maximum cardinality stable matchings in these cases, which remain NP-hard problems [20] . 
Related results
It is straightforward to establish that there can be at most a factor of two difference between the sizes of a minimum and maximum cardinality stable matching for an instance of SMTI or HRT [20] , and as a consequence, breaking ties arbitrarily and applying the appropriate version of the Gale-Shapley algorithm gives 2-approximation algorithms for MAX-SMTI and MAX-HRT. A number of improved approximation algorithms for versions of MAX-SMTI have recently been proposed. For the general case, Iwama et al. [17] gave an algorithm with a performance guarantee of 2 − (c log n)/n, for the case of n men and n women, where c is a positive constant. This was later improved to 2 − c / √ n [18], where c is a positive constant such that c ≤ 1/4 √ 6. Very recently, Iwama et al. [19] gave the first approximation algorithm for the general case with a constant performance guarantee better than 2, namely 15/8. From the inapproximability point of view, Halldórsson et al. [7] showed the problem to be APX-complete, and Halldórsson et al. [8] gave a lower bound of 21/19 on any polynomialtime approximation algorithm (assuming P = N P ). This lower bound applies even to MAX-SSMTI.
As far as special cases are concerned, Halldórsson et al. [8] gave a (2/(1 + T −2 )-approximation algorithm for the case where all ties are on one side, and are of length at most T -so, for example, this gives a bound of 8/5 when all ties are of length 2. If ties are on both sides and restricted to be of length 2, a bound of 13/7 is shown in [8] . Halldórsson et al. [9] also described a randomised algorithm with an expected guarantee of 10/7 for the same special case.
'Cloning' hospitals
It is known that, by identifying residents with men, and 'cloning' each hospital into c women, where c is the hospital's capacity, an instance I of HR may be transformed in linear time to an instance I * of SMI such that there is a bijective function between the set of stable matchings in I and those in I * [6, p.38] (see also [23, pp.131-132] ). A formal proof of this result is given in [2, Lemma 3.1] for the Stable Multiple Activities problem, a many-to-many non-bipartite generalisation of HR. It is not difficult to extend this proof to the HRT case, thus giving a correspondence with SMTI. To be more precise, it can be shown that an instance I of HRT may be transformed in linear time to an instance I * of SMTI with the property that there is a function, surjective in this case, between the set of stable matchings in I and those in I * , under which matching cardinality is preserved.
An immediate consequence of this correspondence between HRT and SMTI is that, given an approximation algorithm A for MAX-SMTI with performance guarantee δ, for some constant δ > 1, we may obtain (except in certain cases) an approximation algorithm for MAX-HRT with the same performance guarantee, simply by applying A to I * and mapping the obtained stable matching S * in I * to a stable matching S in I such that |S| = |S * |. The special cases that cause an exception to this occur when A depends on certain properties of the preference lists which are not preserved under 'cloning': an example of such a property is the length of the ties in the residents' lists, which are in general inflated under such a transformation. This implies that the approximation algorithms for MAX-SMTI mentioned in the previous subsection, except for those with performance guarantees 13/7 and 10/7 [8, 9] , also yield approximation algorithms for corresponding versions of MAX-HRT with the same performance guarantees.
The contribution of this paper
In this paper, we present a polynomial-time 5/3-approximation algorithm for MAX-SHRT, thus improving on the 15/8 bound for the general MAX-HRT case [19] . Since MAX-SSMTI is a special case of MAX-SHRT, the algorithm also applies to the former problem, and we point out some simplifications that apply in the one-to-one case. We also show that this guarantee is the best that can be proved for the algorithm, either for MAX-SSMTI or MAX-SHRT, by providing a family of instances of the former problem for which this bound is realised.
In view of the observations regarding 'cloning' hospitals in the previous subsection, it would have been sufficient to present only the MAX-SSMTI version of our approximation algorithm. However neither the extension of the algorithm to the MAX-SHRT case, nor the derivation of its performance guarantee, are significantly more difficult than for the MAX-SSMTI case. We therefore choose to focus on MAX-SHRT in view of the fact that the above 'cloning' transformation has the undesirable property that the number of women in I * is greater than the number of hospitals in I by a factor of C/n 2 , where C is the sum of the hospital capacities in I and n 2 is the number of hospitals in I. Moreover, if the minimum hospital capacity in I is Ω(c), then the total length of the preference lists in I * is greater than the total length of those in I by a factor of Ω(c). For these reasons, in practical applications such as SFAS and its counterparts in the US and Canada [24, 21, 1] , direct algorithms for finding stable matchings in HRT are routinely employed without resorting to 'cloning' together with the use of algorithms for SMTI. Moreover, a variant of our algorithm for MAX-SHRT has already been implemented and is utilised by SFAS. It is thus with algorithmic efficiency in mind that we present a direct approach for MAX-SHRT.
We finally remark that, in a preliminary version of this paper [14] , an approximation algorithm for MAX-SSMTI was presented with a claimed performance guarantee of 8/5. That bound turned out to be incorrect. This paper not only establishes the correct bound of 5/3 for the approximation algorithm in the MAX-SSMTI case, but also extends the algorithm and the derivation of the same performance guarantee to the MAX-SHRT case.
The approximation algorithm for MAX-SHRT
Algorithm SHRT-APPROX Phase 1
Let I be an instance of SHRT; recall that in I, each resident's preference list is strict, and each hospital's preference list is strict except for a tie (of length ≥ 1) at the end. Henceforth we assume the notation and terminology as defined for an instance of HRT in the previous section.
The first phase of the algorithm is a variant of the hospital-oriented Gale-Shapley algorithm for the standard Hospitals/Residents problem [6, Section 1.6.2]. During this phase, zero or more deletions are made from the preference lists -by the deletion of the pair (r i , h j ), we mean the removal of h j from r i 's list and the removal of r i from that of h j . Initially, every resident is free and every hospital is assigned the empty set of residents. Throughout, a j denotes the number of residents currently assigned to hospital h j . As long as there is a hospital h j for which a j < c j and which has more than a j untied residents on its current list, the resident r i in position a j + 1 is (at least temporarily) assigned to h j , and a j is incremented. If r i was already assigned, say to h k then that assignment is broken, and a k is decremented. Then all pairs (r i , h l ) such that r i prefers h j to h l are deleted. This phase of the algorithm is summarised in Figure 2 .
We now use a j to denote the number of residents assigned to hospital h j on termination of Phase 1 of the algorithm, and we let b j be the total number of untied residents remaining in the preference list of hospital h j . Then it follows from the loop condition that a j = min(b j , c j ). A resident r i can be assigned to at most one hospital, so that if r i is one of the first a j residents on the list of hospital h j , she cannot be one of the first a k residents on the list of h k for any h k = h j . Hence the number of assigned residents is x = n 2 j=1 a j . We denote this set of assigned residents by X, and call its members the X-residents. The remaining residents form the set X, and are the X-residents. At each point during the algorithm's execution, the current preference lists are referred to as the reduced lists.
Lemma 2.1. On termination of Phase 1 of Algorithm SHRT-APPROX, (i) no deleted pair can belong to a stable matching; (ii) for each hospital h j , the first a j residents on h j 's reduced list are assigned in every stable matching, i.e., each X-resident is assigned in every stable matching.
Proof. (i) Suppose that (r i , h j ) is a deleted pair that belongs to a stable matching M , and that (r i , h j ) was the first such pair to be deleted in an execution of Phase 1 of the algorithm. This must have happened because r i became assigned to a hospital h l whom assign each resident to be free; for (each hospital h j ∈ H) a j = 0; while (there exists a hospital h j such that a j < c j and h j has > a j untied residents on its list) { r i = resident in position a j + 1 on h j 's list; assign r i to h j ; a j ++; for (each successor h k of h j on r i 's list) { if (r i is assigned to h k ) { break the assignment; a k --; } delete the pair (r i , h k ) from the preference lists; } } Figure 2 : Phase 1 of Algorithm SHRT-APPROX she prefers to h j . Hospital h l is either under-subscribed in M or prefers r i to at least one member of the set M (h l ). For suppose h l is full in M and prefers all its assignees in M to r i . Then there exists a pair (r k , h l ) in M , already deleted, such that h l prefers r k to r i , contradicting the fact that (r i , h j ) was the first pair of M to be deleted. Hence (r i , h l ) blocks M , a contradiction.
(ii) Suppose that r i is one of the first a j residents at the head of hospital h j 's reduced list, and that M is a stable matching in which r i is unassigned. Then, by part (i), h j is either under-subscribed in M or prefers r i to at least one member of M (h j ), so that (r i , h j ) blocks M , a contradiction.
A refinement of Phase 1 is possible. If, at any stage, the total number of residents remaining on the preference list of a hospital h j is at most c j , then we may assign all of these residents to h j , including any that are in h j 's tie. However, this refinement has no bearing on what happens in the worst case, so for simplicity we choose to omit it.
We call the preference lists that remain after Phase 1 the Phase-1 lists, and if resident r i and hospital h j are in each other's Phase-1 lists, we say that (r i , h j ) is a Phase 1 acceptable pair.
Algorithm SHRT-APPROX Phase 2
We define the Phase 2 capacity c j of a hospital h j to be c j = c j − a j . In this phase of the algorithm, we seek to increase the number of residents who are guaranteed to be assigned. To this end, we find a maximum cardinality many-to-one matching, or degree-constrained subgraph [3] , K of residents to hospitals, where a pair (r i , h j ) can be in K if and only if r i is an X-resident, (r i , h j ) is a Phase 1 acceptable pair, and r i is in the tie in h j 's list. Indeed, it is sufficient to consider only those hospitals H such that c j > 0. Then, for any resident r i ∈ X and for any hospital h j ∈ H , it is immediate that h j 's tie must be non-empty. The cardinality of the subgraph K is maximised with respect to the upper degree-constraining function d : R ∪ H −→ N, where d(r i ) = 1 for each r i ∈ R and d(h j ) = c j for each h j ∈ H. That is, hospital h j can be assigned up to c j residents, but of course each resident with at most one hospital. Having found such a degree-constrained subgraph K, we break the tie in a given hospital h j 's Phase-1 list by promoting those residents r i who are assigned to h j in K, in arbitrary order, ahead of the rest of that tie (leaving the rest of the tie intact). This produces an instance I of SHRT that is a refinement of the original instance I -or more properly, a refinement of the variant of I that results following the deletions of Phase 1; clearly any matching that is stable for I is also stable for I, but not necessarily viceversa. Phase 2 of the algorithm is summarised in Figure 3. (Note that, in the special case of MAX-SSMTI, since all capacities are 1, the maximum cardinality degree-constrained subgraph is just a standard maximum cardinality matching.)
is a Phase 1 acceptable pair and r i is in h j 's tie}; construct the bipartite graph G = (V, E); K = maximum cardinality degree-constrained subgraph in G, d ;
promote r i ahead of the tie in h j 's list; reactivate the loop of Phase 1; Proof. The proof is completely analogous to that of Lemma 2.1(ii).
Note that, while Lemma 2.2 can be expected, in many cases, to give a stronger lower bound on the size of a stable matching than is given by Lemma 2.1, this need not be the case. It is possible that, after Phase 1, each hospital with a positive Phase 2 capacity has only X-residents in its tie, and that, as a consequence, K is the empty set. However, to take account of the general case where K is non-empty, we now partition X to reflect this fact. More precisely, we define Y to be the set of residents who are assigned in K, and define Z = X \ Y , so that X, Y and Z constitute a partition of the set of residents. The residents in sets Y and Z are referred to as Y -residents and Z-residents respectively. We denote |X|, |Y | and |Z| by x, y and z respectively. Let P denote the set of hospital posts in I, say
(Of course, in reality, the hospital posts are indistinguishable, but it is convenient, for our purposes, to label them.)
The next lemma gives a precise consequence of the fact that the degree-constrained subgraph K found in Phase 2 has maximum possible cardinality. Lemma 2.3. Let M be a maximum cardinality stable matching for I. Then |M | ≤ 2x + y.
Proof. Define a subset Q of P as follows:
Then as observed in the paragraph before Lemma 2.1, |Q| = n 2 j=1 a j = x = |X|. (In fact we can construct a perfect matching A * 1 of X to Q as follows: if r i is the kth-best assignee of h j upon termination of Phase 1, add (r i , p j,k ) to A * 1 .) Define Q = P \Q. During Phase 2, a maximum matching K of X to H is found, with respect to the capacities c j = c j − a j for each hospital h j ∈ H . This gives rise to a matching K * of X to Q which can be seen as follows: with respect to instance I * of HR obtained from I by arbitrarily breaking ties, if r i is the kth-best assignee of h j in K, add (r i , p j,a j +k ) to K * . Then |K| = |K * | = y, and K * is a maximum matching of X to Q. Now define M * from M as follows: if r i is the kth-best assignee of h j in M (with respect to the same tie-break instance I * ), add (r i , p j,k ) to M * . Then |M * | = |M |. Moreover for each pair (r i , p j,k ) in M * , at least one of the following holds: (a) r i ∈ X; (b) p j,k ∈ Q; or (c) r i ∈ X and p j,k ∈ Q. The number of pairs satisfying (a) is x, the number satisfying (b) is also x, and the number satisfying (c) is at most y, since y is the size of a maximum matching of X to Q.
Algorithm SHRT-APPROX Phase 3
Phase 3 of the algorithm involves completely breaking the remaining ties and then applying to the resulting instance of HR the standard Gale-Shapley algorithm (in fact, for consistency with Phases 1 and 2, the extended version of that algorithm that deletes redundant entries from the preference lists -see [6] ). The algorithm may be applied from either the residents' or the hospitals' side; as is well known, the size of the resulting matching will be the same in each case. We choose to apply the algorithm in Phase 3 from the residents' side, as is typically done by practical matching schemes that incorporate a variant of the Gale-Shapley algorithm.
Tie-breaking is carried out according to just one restriction, namely, for each tie, the Z-residents are given priority over the X-residents and Y -residents. In other words, each tie is resolved by listing the Z-residents that it contains, in arbitrary order, followed by the X-residents and Y -residents that it contains, again in arbitrary order. (Intuitively, because we know that X-residents and Y -residents will be assigned no matter what, we want to maximise the chances of Z-residents being assigned.) It is immediate that the algorithm produces a matching that is stable for the original instance of HRT. For an instance I of HRT, we denote by I an instance of HR obtained by application of Phases 1 and 2 of Algorithm SHRT-APPROX, followed by tie-breaking according to this rule. Again it is immediate that a matching that is stable for I is also stable for I. Phase 3 of the algorithm is summarised in Figure 4 .
The performance guarantee
Let A be a matching produced by application of Algorithm SHRT-APPROX, and let M be a maximum cardinality stable matching for the original instance I of HRT. As previously established, all of the X-residents and Y -residents are assigned in A. Let us call the residents, necessarily Z-residents, who are assigned in M but not in A, the extra residents (for M relative to A). Also, a hospital h j that has at least one extra resident assigned to it in M will be called a key hospital.
Lemma 2.4. (i) Each key hospital is full in A.
(ii) A key hospital prefers all of its A-assignees who are X-residents, if any, to any extra resident.
Proof. Let h j be a key hospital, and let r i be an extra resident (necessarily a Z-resident) who is assigned to h j in M . Recall that M is stable for the original instance I, while A for (each hospital h j ) break the tie (if any) in h j 's list, placing the Z-residents ahead of the others; // Now apply the standard Gale-Shapley algorithm from the residents' side assign each resident to be free; for (each hospital h j ) a j = 0; while (some resident r i is free and r i has a non-empty list) { h j = first hospital on r i 's list; assign r i to h j ; a j ++; if (a j ≥ c j ) r k = resident ranked in position c j among those assigned to h j ; for (each successor r l of r k on h j 's list) { if (r l is assigned to h j ) { break the assignment; a j --; } delete the pair (r l , h j ) from the preference lists; } } return the set A of assigned pairs; (ii) Let r k be an X-resident who is assigned in A to h j . If h j prefers r i to r k then the pair (r i , h j ) blocks A in I, a contradiction. If r i and r k are tied in h j 's list then, when that tie was broken to form I , r i , being a Z-resident, must have preceded r k in the resulting strict preference list. Hence, since r i is unassigned in A, the pair (r i , h j ) blocks A in I , a contradiction.
Let M be a maximum stable matching in I. Fix an arbitrary tie-break instance I * of I. Form a matching M * as follows: if (r i , h j ) ∈ M and r i is the kth-best assignee of h j in M according to the preferences in I * , add (r i , p j,k ) to M * . Then |M | = |M * |. Form A * from A in an analogous way (with respect to the same tie-break instance I * ). Then |A| = |A * |.
If (r i , p j,k ) ∈ M * and r i is an extra resident, define p j,k to be an extra hospital post. By Lemma 2.4(i), each extra hospital post is assigned in A * . Partition the extra residents into three sets, namely T , U and V according as the post they are assigned in M * is assigned in A * to an X-resident, a Y -resident or a Z-resident, respectively. Let |T | = t, |U | = u and |V | = v.
Our next lemma gives us certain inequalities involving the sizes of matchings M and A that will enable us to establish the claimed performance guarantee for Algorithm SHRT-APPROX.
Proof. (i) The number of extra residents is t + u + v, and, by definition, these are the only residents who are assigned in M but not in A.
(ii) Each extra hospital post p j,k that is assigned in M * to a resident in V is assigned in A * to a Z-resident. This gives us v of the Z-residents who are assigned in A, and together with all x + y of the X-residents and Y -residents who, by Lemma 2.2, are assigned in A, we have a total of x + y + v distinct residents who are assigned in A. (iii) By Lemma 2.4(i), all t + u + v extra hospital posts are assigned in A * . Let r i be a resident in T , and let h j be the hospital that r i is assigned to in M . By definition of T , h j has an X-resident, say r k , as an assignee in A. By Lemma 2.4(ii), h j prefers r k to r i . Now the X-residents are assigned in every stable matching, so in particular are assigned in M . Suppose that (r k , p l,a ) ∈ M * . Then p l,a cannot be an extra hospital post, since the residents assigned to extra hospital posts in M * are Z-residents. We claim that p l,a is assigned in A * . This is true if j = l by Lemma 2.4(i), hence suppose that j = l. It follows that r k prefers h l to h j , for otherwise (r k , h j ) would block M . Furthermore, p l,a must be assigned in A * , for if not, the pair (r k , h l ) would block A. Hence the claim is established, and gives a further t hospital posts (none of which are extra hospital posts as previously observed) that are guaranteed to be assigned in A * , and together with the extra hospital posts, a total of 2t + u + v such hospital posts.
We are now in a position to establish our main theorem. Theorem 2.1. For a given instance of SHRT, or of the special case SSMTI, let M be a maximum cardinality stable matching and let A be a stable matching returned by Algorithm SHRT-APPROX. Then |M | ≤ 5|A|/3.
Proof. From Lemma 2.3 and Lemma 2.5 part (ii) we have
By Lemma 2.5 parts (ii) and (iii) we have
the second inequality following from the fact that residents in U are assigned in M * to a post that is assigned in A * to a Y -resident, so that u ≤ y. By Lemma 2.5 part (i), this implies
Combining (1) and (2) gives
and this, together with the fact that v is non-negative, implies the claimed result.
Complexity of the algorithm
The worst-case complexity of Algorithm SHRT-APPROX is dominated by the maximum cardinality degree-constrained subgraph step in Phase 2. Using Gabow's algorithm [3] , this can be achieved in O( (n 1 + C)L) time, where n 1 is the number of residents, C is the sum of the hospital capacities, and L is the sum of the lengths of the preference lists.
In the special case of SSMTI, Phase 2 is standard maximum cardinality bipartite matching. Using the Hopcroft-Karp algorithm [10] , this can be achieved in O( √ nL) time,
where n is the total number of men and women, and L is the sum of the lengths of the preference lists.
Tightness of the performance guarantee
This is the tightest bound that can be established for Algorithm SHRT-APPROX, even in the one-to-one case of SSMTI. 3 Summary and open problems
We have described a polynomial-time approximation algorithm with a performance guarantee of 5/3 for a maximum cardinality stable matching in an NP-hard variant of the Hospitals/Residents problem that is of significant practical interest, which has a slightly simplified version for the corresponding variant of the Stable Marriage problem. We have also shown that this performance guarantee is the best that can be proved for these algorithms.
The most obvious open question to pursue is whether this or a similar approach can yield useful performance guarantees for more general versions of HRT and SMTI, for example when there can be a single tie at the end of the lists on both sides, or when the lists on one side can contain arbitrary ties. 
